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1. 
A 5gCQN,p L.QQK AX T££ HQRrffil STRIKE 
I. Two Views of the Strike in Austin 
The dispute between the United Food and Commercial Workers 
and its Local P-9 over the long strike at Geo. A. Hormel & Co.'s 
meatpacking plant in Austin, Minnesota has put labor activists on 
two sides of an emotional and strategic divide. P-9 supporters 
see the strike, which began in August, 1985, as the labor battle 
of the decade, with a valiant local union taking a stand against 
unjust concession demands. But besides facing an arrogant boss, a 
plant full of strikebreakers and the Minnesota National Guard, 
the local has had to contend with a betrayal of its effort by the 
national union. The UFCW argued that the local should 
accept a mediator's proposal that would have ended the strike in 
January, 1986, and has now placed the local in trusteeship and 
moved to end the strike with an unconditional offer to return to 
work . 
In the view of P-9 advocates, the strike in Austin is a which-
side-are-you-on contest between labor progressives anxious to 
rebuild militant, democratic trade unionism, and labor 
bureaucrats unwilling to risk tough struggle to revive their 
sagging fortunes.Nothing less than the fate of the labor 
movement is in the balance. In this light, any criticism of Local 
P-9's strategy and tactics must be suspended to avoid undermining 
the strike. 
On the other side the P-9 strike is viewed as a solo flight to 
self-destruction by a misguided local union that broke with its 
counterparts in the Hormel chain and the meatpacking industry to 
seek a better plant-level, single local deal from Austin manage-
ment. First, P-9 took its problems to a series of disastrous 
arbitrations which ended with members suffering a huge back pay 
obligation to the company. Then the local bought a snake-oil 
corporate campaign promise fron a slick outside consultant, based 
on a flimsy connection between Hormel and one of its creditor 
banks. When that failed, P-9 launched the strike that has split 
the local between strikers and members who returned to work and 
cost a thousand people their jobs. In all, say defenders of the 
International, it was a rule-or-ruin crusade doomed to ruin from 
the outset. According to this view the dispute is not between 
labor progressives and labor hacks, but between kamikaze 
unionists and responsible unionists. 
The burden of proof is on defenders of the UFCW. A presumption 
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in favor of the local union is not unfair, given the record of 
many internationals stifling local efforts to promote 
more combativeness toward employers and more democracy in union 
affairs. And even without such a presumption, many unionists 
around the country see a group of workers in a fight for their 
lives and rally to their side, not caring who is right or wrong 
in the war of words between the local and the national union 
("Hitlerite," some UFCW officials have called P-9's tactics; 
"sleazy as the corporate officers" is the rejoinder from P-9 
spokesmen). 
Unfortunately there is no straddling this gap. Rhetoric on 
both sides can get overblown, but when it is stripped away two 
fundamentally different visions of what the strike has meant and 
what the labor movement is all about remain in conflict. Anyone 
who cares about American trade unionism -- especially among 
unionists who have argued for more rank and file involvement and 
more of a fighting spirit in the labor movement -- has to make an 
honest analysis of the P-9 strike. 
II. Industrial Unionism and Enterprise Unionism 
There is much to praise, even to marvel at, in the strike at 
Austin. Strike organizers have emphasized innovative tactics and 
rank and file involvement in strike committees and activities. 
The determination of the strikers, the reaching out to unionists 
and community supporters throughout the country, all these have 
have been a model of what the labor movement should be doing and 
has largely failed to do. But the underlying strategy of the P-9 
strike is fatally flawed. The result, notwithstanding admirable 
strike conduct and widespread support, is a plant full of strike-
breakers, including hundreds of P-9's members, and the danger of 
the Hormel company's main plant going non-union. 
Despite its sometimes clumsy handling of the dispute, the UFCW 
is right on the basic issues at stake in Austin. The most 
important conquest of the labor movement in this century has been 
the establishment of industrial unionism that unites workers as a 
class, regardless of race, sex, skills and other divisions, to 
confront the giant employers that dominate the U.S. economy. In 
practice, industrial unionism takes shape in industry-wide 
organizing and bargaining to standardize wages and benefits as 
much as possible, taking labor costs out of competition so that 
employers cannot ratchet down contract conditions by pitting one . 
local against another. 
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In contrast, P-9 leaders are clear that theirs is a strategy 
of enterprise-based unionism, where a single local works out the 
best deal possible from local plant management. Because the 
Austin 'plant is brand new, highly productive and highly 
profitable, say P-9 spokesmen, the company should pay more to 
Austin workers than it is paying other Hormel workers in the 
older plants. And if the Austin plant were unprofitable, or even 
less profitable, says local P-9 leadership, the union would be 
offering concessions to management. Indeed, local P-9 proposed to 
Austin management a kind of reverse profit-sharing plan for 
the Austin plant, offering to accept pay cuts if profits fell 
below customary levels. The local union also made proposals that 
would have resulted in the shutdown of at least two other 
union-represented Hormel plants. 
In other words, this is not an anti-concession strike in 
principle. Local P-9 wants to take responsibility for Austin 
management's success or failure in making profits at the single 
enterprise. It wants to link wages to productivity and profits 
at the plant level rather than pursue the pattern-bargained, 
industry-wide agreements of the past. This is precisely what 
most "enlightened" employers and labor economists are calling 
for:- a turn away from supposedly old-fashioned, 1930's-style 
industrial unionism to a new era of responsible, profit-and-loss-
driven enterprise unionism. 
The push for enterprise unionism and the efforts of genuine 
trade unionists to preserve industrial unionism is the real 
crisis in the labor movement today. The fight against 
concessions is just one element in that deeper struggle. 
Any local union's strike or other battle against concessions 
must take into account the higher imperative of saving industrial 
unionism, or there will be no stopping concessions from anyone. 
Unions in every industry are faced with the crisis of 
industrial versus enterprise unionism: 
*Autoworkers saw their "Big Three" contract pattern fall 
apart after the Chrysler bankruptcy threat of the late 1970's. 
It took a tough strike by Chrysler workers to move back toward 
parity in the industry. Now the autoworkers are wrestling with 
company moves to play off one local against another through 
outsourci ng threats, and with the implications of. a 
separate "Saturn" agreement at a new General Motors plant in 
Tennessee -- whether that contract's plan to tie wages to 
profits will spread into the other basic auto plants. 
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*Steelworkers are now faced with separate, company-by-company 
bargaining with the steel producers after employers dissolved 
their industry bargaining council to go after the union on a 
single-firm basis in place of the industry-wide contract that 
has prevailed for nearly, three decades. 
*The United Mine Workers conducted a long, bitter strike to 
prevent Massey coal company from establishing mine-by-mine 
contracts apart from the national coal agreement. Coal employers 
would like nothing better than company-based bargaining; that 
the UMWA has been able to maintain a single national agreement 
in spite of such pressures has been an important protection for 
the entire labor movement. 
*Teamster local unions are plagued by constant company moves 
to break away from the Master Freight Agreement to bargain 
locally. Likewise, the union has been pressed hard to change its 
biggest national contract, with United Parcel Service, 
into a series of city-by-city pacts. 
*The Communications Workers are trying to maintain national 
bargaining with the regional telephone companies and other 
spinoffs of the former AT&T monopoly. They have convinced five 
of the regionals to bargain jointly, but are faced with two 
holdouts that want local bargaining. 
*Electrical workers' unions that bargain with General 
Electric, Westinghouse and other big companies are challenged by 
company moves to turn national bargaining with a multi-union 
coordinated bargaining committee into union-by-union and local-
by-local bargaining. Westinghouse workers had to strike in 1982 
to block bargaining on a "business group" basis according to 
product line. General Electric uses joint ventures and plant 
sales to local managements to take shops out from under its 
national contracts. 
*Airline unions are trying to find a way back to pattern 
bargaining after an almost total breakdown in the wake of deregu-
lation of the industry. They have the larger structural problem 
of several unions representing different employee groups in the 
same company, with difficulty in coordinating bargaining and 
strike activity. 
-East and Gulf coast shipping employers have announced their 
intention to bargain separately with the International Longshore-
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men's Association, both in divided coastal talks and in 
separate, port-by-port negotiations to put longshore locals in 
competition with one another. 
Ill. The Real Threat to Labor 
It is this breakdown of industrial unionism and introduction 
of enterprise unionism, not concessions in and of themselves, 
that pose the real threat to the labor movement. P-9 advocates 
will say that any union opposed to concessions should back P-9 or 
it is selling out the struggle against concessions. But unions 
have a higher duty than fighting concessions tout court: 
preserving the unity of their membership and the unity of their 
movement as a defender of working class interests. 
The key guestion is how to fight concessions, ho-w to 
take on the companies? The answer is collectively, on an 
industrial basis, not by one local union, however militant or 
heroic, going off on its own. The .industrial approach does not 
guarantee success, or guarantee that unions will never have to 
accept concessions. But in the long run the unity of industrial 
unionism is the best guarantee of progress for working people. 
To the extent that union leaders commit themselves to 
enterprise unionism based on the single plant or firm, they tear 
their members away from identification with other workers as a 
class. In its place is an identification with the enterprise: 
labor and management struggling shoulder -to-shoulder against 
the competitive threat of other workers. This does not preclude 
strikes or other strife between employers and enterprise 
unionists. Workers can still think they are getting a raw deal 
from local management for not treating them better than other 
workers in the industry. The logic of special, local treatment, 
however, is the same. 
The outcome of the struggle between industrial unionism 
and enterprise unionism will determine the nature of the labor 
movement in decades to come. Concessions can be won back in later 
bargaining, as many unions have shown. But a fundamental 
shift to enterprise unionism will destroy whatever class 
consciousness still exists in the labor movement. 
P-9's argument that Austin workers deserve more than other 
Hormel workers, and that P-9 would be offering .concessions to 
management if the plant were in trouble -- is of a piece with 
the enterprise union offensive of the employers. Calling itself 
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a special case and demanding a separate Austin-only solution, 
offering concessions to management tied to a drop in profits, 
stressing the historic paternalism of Hormel's "flagship" Austin 
plant with declarations like "George Hormel would turn over 
in his grave," Local P-9 is clearly in the enterprise union camp. 
IV. The Cris is in Meatpacking 
The UFCW packinghouse workers division and its young leader 
Lewie Anderson are trying to maintain an industrial union 
strategy to restore standard wages and conditions to the industry 
and prevent employers from playing off one local against another, 
or one company's workers against another's. They are not having 
an easy time of it. Meatpacking companies have launched what is 
probably the broadest attack on a union by employers in any 
single industry, using plant closings, bankruptcy ploys, divesti-
tures and acquisitions, marketing agreements and other devices to 
scrap union contracts or cut wages and benefits to the bone. 
The industrial union model cracked in the meatpacking 
industry in the early 1980's. Workers in old, multi-story plants 
nearing the end of their useful lives, often in small, 
one-company towns in the midwest, started caving in to local-
level concession demands to save their jobs. New, low-wage 
producers were cutting into market shares of the established 
packers, creating a prospect of more job loss. 
One major company, Wilson Foods, declared bankruptcy and 
scrapped its union contracts. Swift & Co. sold off many of 
its plants which were shut down, and then re-opened later as 
non-union shops. Several meatpacking locals in other shops 
broke the industry pattern in a frantic underbidding competition 
with one another. Wages began a free fall from the $10.69 hourly 
base pay that prevailed before the deluge hit. It was this 
disarray that Anderson and the national union sought to repair 
with a strategy to consolidate forces at the $8-$9 hourly wage 
level, then fight back together toward a new standard. 
There would be nothing wrong with a P-9 strike for more 
money based on company profitability if the Austin plant stood 
alone. But there are ten other UFCW-represented plants in the 
Hormel chain, and dozens more among other major meatpacking 
companies. A union cannot have it both ways: if profitable 
plants should pay more, then less profitable plants can pay 
less. That kind of logic is exactly what led to the breakdown of 
industry-wide standards in the years before the Austin strike. 
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It is also the logic that the UFCW's packinghouse division and 
Anderson are trying to refute. The results are admittedly 
mixed. After all, they are fighting the logic of the capitalist 
system itself -- hardly an easy task. 
He is heaped with abuse from Local P-9 spokesmen as a high-
paid labor boss, but Anderson is a genuine rank 
and file leader who cut his union teeth leading long strikes 
against Iowa Beef, the toughest employer in the 
industry. Contrary to P'9's assertion that the national union has 
followed a strategy of deliberate retreat, UFCW packinghouse 
workers have been fighting back against the companies' attacks. 
The union has allowed more than thirty plants to shut down by 
refusing to agree to concession demands that would undercut a 
movement back toward industry standards. Several of those locals 
have sued the national union for not letting them accept 
concessions. In addition, there have been more strikes 
in the meatpacking industry over the past five years 
than in any other single U.S. industry, not counting the P-9 
strike. The UFCW has had sixteen major strikes involving 27,000 
workers, nearly one third of the workforce, since 1982. The 
strikes have averaged four months' duration. Obviously the 
union has not succeeded fully in restoring industry standards or 
returning to the $10.69 base wage. But Anderson and the 
meatpacking chain locals know they are in a long range struggle 
that cannot be decisively won in a single stroke. 
V. Background: History 
Some history and some numbers are overdue here. While Armour, 
Swift, John Morrell, Wilson Foods and other meatpacking companies 
negotiated single, company-wide agreements covering all their 
locations before the 1980's, Hormel always negotiated plant-level 
contracts. In the early 1970's, however, a de facto chain 
bargaining process began. Hormel and its UFCW locals negotiated 
a single "memorandum for agreement" covering the chain shops. 
That agreement was then signed and -implemented locally, 
including in Austin. 
Hormel's chain-wide agreements of the 1970's were consistent 
with the industry standard set in bargaining, often after 
a long strike, in another company. The UFCW and its Hormel 
locals were making progress toward a master agreement in Hormel, 
a longstanding goal of the union and its members. A 1978 special 
agreement in Austin covering the construction of a new plant 
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there was seen as a temporary deviation from chain bargaining. 
Even that agreement was based on continued application of 
industry standards. 
A small history of meatpacking unionism is also important in 
understanding the current mess. The UFCW is really an amalgam of 
three major unions with distinct traditions: the staid Retail 
Clerks, an old American Federation of Labor union that took 
shape among store clerks and other white-collar employees; the 
AFL Meatcutters union which had a conservative outlook common to 
highly skilled tradesmen, but a nonetheless rich history of 
tough strikes over bread and butter issues; and the Packinghouse 
Workers union, one of the CIO industrial unions founded in the 
strikes and sit-ins of the 1930's. Both the Meatcutters and the 
Packinghouse Workers organized packing plants. After three 
decades of rivalry they merged, forming a single union to 
represent packinghouse workers. Since they also represented 
supermarket meatcutters, a merger with the Retail Clerks took 
place so they could confront the big supermarket chains with a 
s ingle voice. 
Within the UFCW workers in Hormel and the other packing plants 
shape their own bargaining program and policies through a 
national packing committee, consisting not of Washington union 
bureaucrats but of delegates from local unions throughout the 
industry. Most of the locals, including most Hormel locals, are 
solidly behind their union in the P-9 dispute, believing that 
their only hope lies in rebuilding unity in the industry. 
P-9 supporters point eagerly to a few locals that support the 
Austin strike as proof that they must be right, but this really 
begs the question. One can look at any national union, from the 
worst to the best, and find locals that take an anti-internation-
al stance for all kinds of good and bad reasons.lt proves nothing 
about the merits of the Austin debate. The point here is 
that it is not the UFCW as a whole, but packinghouse workers 
through their packing committee, that are the protagonists in 
their struggles with the' packing companies. To argue, as many 
P-9 supporters do, that the UFCW's record in the supermarket 
industry or some other sector is proof of the union's surrender 
in the concessions struggle is to misunderstand the structure of 
the union and to misrepresent the fightback efforts of the 
packinghouse division. 
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VI: Background: Numbers 
Now for some numbers. The anti-concession nature of the Austin 
strike is complicated. The figure most often used is the pay cut 
from $10.69 per hour to $8.25 per hour in October, 1984, a nearly 
25% cut. But when Austin 'workers went on strike in August, 1985 
they were making $9.25 an hour -- 25 cents an hour more than the 
rest of the Hormel chain. In fact, Austin workers' pay was never 
cut to $8.25; an arbitrator's decision in March, 1985 raised the 
permitted pay cut to $8.75 an hour effective September 3, 1984, 
and provided a 50 cent raise to $9.25 in July, 1985. Meanwhile 
the rest of the chain, bargaining without P-9, had reached a 
settlement in October, 1984 that set a $9.00 base wage effective 
September 1, 1984, with a $1.00 per hour increase on September 1, 
1985. All these movements involved cuts from the $10.69 standard, 
which had been already eroded in other meatpacking companies 
after the wave of attacks of the early 1980's. 
To get the initial cut to $8.25 in Austin Hormel invoked a 
"most-favored-nation" or "me-too" clause that Local P-9 had 
agreed to in 1978 as part of a "New Plant Agreement" promising 
three years with a no-strike clause upon the opening of a 
newly-built plant in Austin. In exchange for the no-strike 
clause, Austin management agreed to match industry pay standards 
set in packinghouse workers' bargaining with five major Hormel 
competitors (Wilson, Swift, John Morrell, Oscar Mayer and 
Armour). The new plant geared into operation, and the New Plant 
Agreement took effect, in August of 1982. 
By mid-1984 industry standards had dropped after individual 
locals began cutting plant-level deals to save jobs. To end what 
was becoming a panic, Anderson and the council sought to 
stabilize the standard in the mid-$8.00 range. The union 
undertook several tough strikes and let many plants shut down to 
try to end the fall. When it entered chain bargaining in Hormel, 
a still-profitable company, the UFCW meatpacking division hoped 
to settle higher and begin ratcheting wages upward again. 
When Anderson and the other Hormel locals asked P-9 to 
add its weight to mid-1984 chain-wide negotiations 
with the company (the Austin plant accounted for over 40% of 
Hormel's total production), P-9 leaders declined. They cited 
the no-strike clause in the New Plant Agreement and the 
company's vow to sue P-9 for damages, if it joined a strike. P-9 
leaders told the other chain locals they would rather have the 
company implement the me-too cuts in Austin and take it to 
arbitration'-than to risk a possible strike in chain bargaining. 
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The national union advised Local P-9 to stick with the .chain 
and not rely on arbitration, saying the local did not have a 
strong case to begin with, and that the consequences of a 
separate arbitrator-imposed settlement in Austin would hurt 
chain bargaining in the long run. Hormel took the position that 
it would apply a chain settlement in Austin if Local P-9 
participated in chain bargaining, but that if P-9 wanted to hash 
it out in arbitration they would have to live with the results 
and deal with the company on a local basis. For P-9, as it would 
be for any proud local union, this was a challenge hard to duck. 
VII. From Arbitration to the Corporate Campaign 
As noted above, the rest of the Hormel chain settled on a $9.00 
rate as of September 1, 1984 with a $1.00 increase a year later. 
P-9 went to arbitration (actually, a series of successively more 
damaging arbitrations) and got stuck with an $8.75 pay rate 
effective September 3, 1984 with a 50 cent raise set for July, 
1985. Unfortunately, the arbitrator also ruled that Austin 
management could cut pensions, medical coverage and other 
benefits in line with industry changes under the me-too clause. 
His decision in March, 1985 made all such contract 
changes retroactive to September,' 1984. As a result, Austin 
workers had to pay back over $600,000 to management for their 
higher benefit levels from September to March, by means of a 
payroll deduction. In fact, they never received the $8.75 and 
$9.25 per hour pay set by the arbitrator. 
Whether P-9 and the union could have brazened out the Austin 
local's participation in chain bargaining and a possible strike 
in September, 1984 is now just a matter of speculation. But it is 
a matter of record that the national union gave Local P-9 sound 
advice about the arbitration gambit. At that point, after the 
arbitration decision, the local might have taken its lumps and 
rejoined the chain to prepare for 1986 negotiations. It could 
have developed a program of "in-plant struggle" which many 
unions have turned to in similar circumstances. By then,however, 
P-9 had engaged an outside consultant to wage a vaunted 
corporate campaign against Hormel and one of its creditors, 
First Bank System, Inc. Perhaps the arbitration route had failed, 
said P-9 leaders, but a corporate campaign to "Break the Hormel-
First Bank Connection" would force the company to settle with the 
Austin local and restore the $10.69 rate separate from the other 
Hormel locals. 
Much has been made of the large fee that Corporate Campaign, 
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Inc., the New York-based consulting firm that ran the 
Hormel-First Bank campaign, reportedly charged to Local P-9, and 
reports of an even large "bonus" if the $10.69 wage rate were 
won. But money is really secondary to the issue, as in 
arbitration, of a union substituting outside forces for its own 
resources and its own collective strength in an industrial union 
setting. 
-Corporate Campaign, Inc. specializes in campaigns focused on 
banks and other lending institutions that finance corporate 
operations. By cutting off a company's source of credit, or at 
least by frightening management with the possibility of a 
cut-off, goes CCI's theory, the company will be forced to settle 
a labor dispute. 
The P-9 dispute at Hormel was a laboratory test of CCI's bank-
targeting strategy. Officials of Hormel and First Bank System, 
Inc., one of the midwest's largest banking companies, sit on 
each other's board of directors. With over 10% of Hormel's common 
stock, First'Bank is Hormel's second-largest shareholder. The 
bank also maintains a revolving line of credit for Hormel. The 
relationship went back for decades, too. In the 1920's Hormel 
; and the bank bailed each other out of financial difficulties. 
Since then they have always had interlocking directors and a 
debtor-creditor relationship. Based on this background, CCI 
declared that if First Bank told Hormel to end the dispute in 
Austin the company would settle. CCI guaranteed success of a 
corporate campaign against Hormel and First Bank when Local P-9 
hired the firm late in 1984. 
The UFCW is no slouch in these matters either, with one of 
the best research departments in the labor movement. The union 
did its own analysis of the Hormel-First Bank link and concluded 
it did not provide enough vulnerability to move the company. 
Again, the union asked Local P-9 to drop the solo effort to take 
on the company in Austin and to rejoin the chain setup. P-9 
rejected the union's advice and launched the corporate campaign. 
As later with the strike effort, P-9's corporate campaign was 
a model of rank and file activity and coalition building. For 
months hundreds of members wrote letters, leafleted homes, 
rallied and demonstrated to "Break the Hormel-First Bank 
Connection", the campaign's slogan.- The problem was, the 
connection held, as the UFCW had predicted. 
CCI claimed to "uncover" the relationship between Hormel and 
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First Bank. But there was nothing novel about it. The act itself 
of revealing such a tie means little. The key variable is actual 
dependence, not the mere fact of a financial relationship. 
With just three directors in common out of more than 
twenty on the two boards, with Hormel management firmly in 
control of its stock voting powers, with credit relationships 
with many other banks in the midwest, Hormel was not so 
dependent on First Bank as to do its bidding even if the 
corporate campaign had succeeded in cracking the bank. 
But the bank, too, was impervious to a corporate campaign-style 
attack. First Bank is a decentralized holding company with 152 
banks in five states, most with thousands of small depositors. 
The leverage just was not there to shake the bank with calls for 
deposit withdrawals and letters of protest to bank officials. 
Several months of campaigning against First Bank and Hormel 
throughout 1985 failed to bend either of them. The effort ran 
into legal trouble when court injunctions scuttled plans to 
picket Fi.rst Bank branches. A National Labor Relations Board 
judge later found that First Bank's connection with Hormel was 
not sufficient to make the bank a primary employer in the 
dispute, which meant that any picketing of the banks would be an 
illegal secondary boycott. 
The legal problem alone does not explain the failure of the 
corporate campaign in Austin. After all, the federal courts and 
the NLRB are not in business to help workers. But in any large 
scale anti-corporate campaign many such legal, financial, 
logistical and other obstacles arise. It was versatility, not a 
single overwhelming tactic, that helped union campaigns prevail 
in J.P. Stevens, Litton Industries, Beverly Nursing Homes, Yale 
University and other targets of other union corporate campaigns 
while the bank-centered specialty of CCI foundered in Austin. 
Suppleness in tactics is not the only issue here. Those other 
union campaigns were carried out by union staffers under 
organizational discipline in an integrated program that 
reconciled diverse union interests. Union affairs contain so 
many subtleties of relationships among local, regional and 
national bodies, relations with other unions, with 
employers in an industry, with government officials and so on 
that' only a leadership with a firm grasp of all the elements and 
all the interests can rightly guide a campaign against corporate 
power. Staffers conducting the details of the campaign have to 
accept leadership on this basis. 
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But what if leadership is corrupt, or afraid, or just plain 
wrong? These problems are common in the labor movement. But it 
is up to workers in an industry to correct them through the 
procedures and structures of their union. They cannot be 
corrected by a single local declaring itself a vanguard. In any 
event, Lewie Anderson and the packinghouse workers union have 
shown neither corruption, nor fear, nor error on the question of 
the corporate campaign or other facets of the P-9 dispute. They 
gave the local their best advice, which is the obligation of a 
national union to provide. As it turned out, they were right. 
VI11. P-9's Response: The Telegram and the "Missing Language" 
P-9 partisans will argue that this whole analysis stands 
truth on its head. It was the national union that hung P-9 out 
to dry, they say, isolating the 'local because P-9 would not go 
along with the union's concessionary policy. P-9 cites two 
incidents as evidence of UFCW perfidy: a telegram supposedly 
excluding P-9 from a meeting of Hormel locals involved in chain 
bargaining in 1984, and what P-9 leaders call the "missing 
language" betrayal that let the company cut Austin pay and left 
P-9 out of the 1984 talks. 
On close examination the telegram proves nothing. It is more 
a prop for theatrical effect of the "I have in my hand..." type. 
P-9 spokesmen rarely quote it because it would leave listeners 
scratching their heads as to whether it is an invitation, a 
non-invitation or a dis-invitation. At any rate, P-9 leaders 
attended the meeting they were supposedly not invited to. It was 
there they announced that the local would prefer to arbitrate 
the Austin contract rather than participate in chain bargaining. 
Ambiguities in the oddly-worded telegram hardly prove the 
"icing" of P-9 that its leaders decry. 
The "missing language" issue is equally murky. An interim 
wage agreement reached in 1981 with major meatpacking companies, 
including Hormel, froze cost-of-living adjustments and wage 
levels through September, 1985, but provided a wage re-opener 
with a right to strike in September, 1984. A summary of this 
1981 "COLA Agrement" prepared by the packinghouse division and 
sent to all locals in the industry, including P-9, stated "there 
will be no increase or reduction in rates" through September, 
1985 except as might be negotiated in the 1984 wage re-opener. 
When the COLA Agreement took effect in 1981, Local P-9 was 
Ik. 
still working under the Old Plant Agreement that was part of the 
overall chain settlement. But when the new Austin plant went 
into full production in August, 1982, P-9 switched to the New 
Plant Agreement with its me-too wage language and a three-year 
no-strike clause. 
When Hormel locals entered chain bargaining under the 
September, 1984 wage re-opener provision of the COLA Agreement, 
Austin management declared that P-9 was bound by the New Plant 
Agreement and thus had no right to strike with the rest of the 
chain. The company did say it would apply a chain settlement in 
Austin if P-9 accepted it, but if P-9 refused the company would 
go ahead with its proposed cuts under the me-too clause, defend 
its position in arbitration and deal with P-9 on a local basis. 
After that came the lost arbitrations, the failed corporate 
campaign and the broken strike. 
P-9 leaders argue that the UFCW misled Austin workers with 
its 1981 summary of the COLA Agreement, and that the national 
union was derelict in not enforcing the 1984 wage re-opener and 
right to strike in Austin. The national explains that it was 
negotiating an industry-wide agreement with all the major 
packers, and that the summary accurately reflected the overall 
agreement. It was Local P-9's responsibility to inquire how the 
COLA Agreement would affect the New Plant Agreement since it was 
clear that the new plant would open in 1982. P-9 never raised 
the issue. In fact, P-9 did not begin raising the "missing 
language" problem until long after the local discovered the 
language was missing, when they began looking around for clubs to 
smack the national with. 
P-9 tested its position on the. missing language issue with 
yet another doomed arbitration in early 1985. The arbitrator 
ruled on the central issue in the missing language dispute: 
whether the 1981 COLA Agreement with its 1984 re-opener and 
right to strike superseded the 1982-85 New Plant Agreement with 
its me-too and no-strike clauses (which had been negotiated, 
remember, in 1978). The arbitrator decided in favor of the 
company, ruling the New Plant Agreement supreme and saying it 
was P-9 that was derelict in not seeking to clarify its rights. 
Frankly, both the local and the national make valid 
criticisms of the other in connection with the telegram and 
"missing language" controversies. But what we have here are 
really run-of-the-mill lapses in a complicated bargaining 
situation, more or less normal screw-ups in a process that is 
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never smooth. A lot of Biblical scholarship has been applied to 
the ambiguities in the telegram, the COLA Agreement, the Old 
Plant Agreement, the New Plant Agreement and other documents 
that swirl around the P-9 strike. But the chicken-and-egg, who 
shot John, so's your old man, you-can't-fire-me-I-quit nature of 
the argument on both sides misses the basic issue. 
IX. Fundamental Issues, Fundamental Lessons 
The basic issue is this: what is the best way for workers to 
confront a big, multi-plant company like Hormel — in solidarity 
as a group, requiring some sacrifice of local goals for the good 
of the whole, or in a single local, flagship plant shootout with 
the company? Local P-9 opted for the latter approach. They made 
a mistake. There is nothing shameful in that; unions make many 
mistakes, and try to learn from them. 
The tragedy in the P-9 situation is the failure to learn. 
First the local was going to whip the company in arbitration. 
Then the corporate campaign became the path to victory. Next, 
the strike would force the company to concede. Now a boycott is 
going to do the trick, or a $13 million lawsuit against the 
national union. It has been one false promise after another. 
The basic lesson that Austin workers must draw is that their 
enterprise union strategy is insufficient no matter now militant 
or creative or involving its tactics have been. Their belief 
that the modern, productive, profitable Austin plant compels 
Hormel to pay more to P-9 members than to other Hormel workers 
in older plants is the wrong starting point. That is why the 
entire effort has flopped in spite of its marvelous tactics. 
In the early, heady days of the corporate campaign and the 
strike, P-9 proclaimed a "100% victory or 100% defeat" effort, 
in contrast to the short-selling compromises of the labor 
bureaucrats. They have backed away from the term now, but it was 
a standard part of the pump-'em-up rhetoric. 
A strategy of 100% victory overlooks the fact that we live in 
a capitalist system. Working people cannot win 100% victories in 
this economy and this society. By definition, victories come in 
half-loaves. Progress is slow and often uneven. Sometimes even 
the most militant union has to take a step back. 
Any union leader who declares 100% victory as the objective 
of a collective bargaining struggle is deceiving himself or 
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herself and the membership. Any unionist who has led workers out 
on strike, and then led them back to work with a settlement, 
knows it takes high goals and lofty rhetoric to pump up 
sentiment for the strike. But it also takes a margin of 
compromise to settle it. The result is often a charge of 
"sellout," and indeed negotiators sometimes misjudge, or shrink 
from struggle, or sell out, settling for less than could have 
been achieved. If an honest labor leader doesn't lose sleep 
wondering if he or she settled too soon, collective bargaining 
is the wrong line of work. 
The final struggle of song may one day come, but it will be a 
political struggle, not a collective bargaining dispute. In the 
meantime, the labor movement and its allies must settle for 
partial victories at best and sometimes, as unions are often 
forced to do in the current economic and political climate, for 
orderly retreats to fight another day. 
None of this is meant to detract from the personal heroism of 
P-9 leaders and members and their example of a militant, active 
strike effort. UFCW spokesmen condemn P-9 for "tactics that 
would have made Goebbels proud." But it is just such effective 
propaganda and zeal -- in the non-perjorative senses -- that the 
labor movement needs to win more strikes and organizing 
campaigns. Nonetheless, all of a union's resources and all the 
possibilities of militant, creative tactics must be measured 
against the power of the employers and the power of the state in 
formulating a strategy for labor. 
X. The Final Argument 
The ultimate argument of P-9 supporters, and really the most 
compelling one, goes like this: Screw all this high-falutin' 
theory and strategy and second-guessing and armchair 
quarterbacking. Whatever mistakes they made, P-9 members are 
locked in struggle with the boss., and that's what unions should 
be about. They're doing something to fight concessions, not just 
making statements. It's the duty of every genuine unionist to 
support them, and anybody who doesn't, or who at least doesn't 
keep quiet if they disagree, is betraying those workers and 
objectively siding with the company. 
But supporting the Austin strike on the "P-9 right or wrong" 
basis is an abdication of responsibility. If one truly believes 
that P-9 is right to bargain locally for a better deal than 
other Hormel workers, then unstinting support is in order. But 
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if one believes- that UFCW packinghouse workers are trying to 
fight concessions on an industrial union basis, however 
imperfectly, and that P-9's enterprise union approach is wrong, 
and that the reason P-9's fine tactics have failed is because of 
this strategic error, and that it can only result in worse 
damage to workers in the industry and to the labor movement 
generally, there is an obligation to say so. 
The entire Austin story is a drama with no villains and many 
heroes. They include the P-9 strikers who have conducted an 
inspiring struggle against overwhelming odds. They also include 
workers throughout the meatpacking industry who have also been 
struggling, perhaps with less flair for the dramatic but with as 
much determination, to maintain industrial unionism in the face 
of equally tough odds. 
What is needed now is an acknowledgement from P-9 that the 
local can only make progress against a big company like Hormel 
in industrial union chain bargaining with their national union. 
Correspondingly, the UFCW could apply the tactical lessons of 
p-9's spirited struggle and welcome the local's participation in 
future bargaining with Hormel and throughout, the industry. In 
this light, the responsibility of labor allies is to support such 
a reconciliation. 
